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Abstract 
The wide-ranging Varieties of Capitalism literature rests on a particular conception of 
banks and banking, which, we argue, no longer reflects the reality of modern financial 
systems. We take advantage of the greater information regarding bank activities 
revealed by the financial crisis to consider the reality, across eight of the world’s 
largest developed economies, of the ‘financial power’ of banks to act as bulwarks 
against market forces. This article offers a ‘market-based banking’ framework that 
transcends the bank-based/capital market-based dichotomy that dominates 
Comparative Political Economy’s (CPE’s) consideration of financial systems, and 
argues for a future CPE research focus on the activities of banks. By demonstrating 
how market-based banking increases market influences on the supply of credit, we 
highlight an under-appreciated source of financial market pressure on non-financial 
companies (NFCs) that has potential impact across the range of issues that the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has seen as differentiating national systems, 
with implications in areas such as labor, welfare, innovation and flexibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
In this article we challenge the core assumption on which Comparative Political 
Economy’s (CPE’s) bank-based/capital market-based ‘dichotomous framing’ rests.1 
This core assumption is that, in certain countries, banks possess the ‘financial power’2 
that enables them to mitigate the impact of financial market pressures on non-
financial companies (NFCs) with which they have a long-term relationship. By 
focusing on the activities of commercial banks in eight countries over the period from 
2000 until the international financial crisis erupted in 2007, we show how, to varying 
degrees, ‘market-based banking’ better describes the provision of credit to NFCs and 
encapsulates how movements in financial markets affect the pricing and availability 
of that credit. Market-based banking more accurately characterizes the place of banks 
within financial markets and points to a research agenda that allows a clearer 
understanding of the extent of convergence between national financial systems. 
 
This article is structured as follows. Section one offers a rationale for closely studying 
banks as a key subject of research in CPE. We highlight the importance of patient 
capital in the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature, and of bank ‘financial power’ 
to that patience. Section two discusses the dominant bank-credit / capital market 
dichotomy in CPE and the centrality of ‘financial power’. Section three presents 
‘market-based banking’ as both a more accurate way to consider banks within 
political economy and as undermining banks’ financial power. Section four analyses 
the details of some banking practices revealed by the 2007-08 financial crisis, to both 
begin to expand on the concept of market-based banking and compare its extent 
across the eight countries considered in detail here. The conclusion reviews 
                                                 
1
 Culpepper 2005, Clift 2007. 
2
 Zysman 1983. 
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implications for CPE scholarship; in particular for the conception of bank-based 
financial systems. We argue that important changes in bank lending are encapsulated 
in a market-based banking model that provides a better understanding of national 
financial systems and hence theories of comparative capitalism. 
 
The Importance of banks and banking for Comparative Political Economy 
 
‘[A] firm-centered political economy that regards [non-financial] companies as the 
crucial actors in a capitalist economy’3 has dominated the recent CPE literature. 
Finance has attracted more limited attention and a core bank-based / market-based 
dichotomy has persisted. CPE studies on banks and banking systems are particularly 
lacking.
4
 By contrast, the financial economics sub-field has clearly noticed 
developments in banks and their impact upon national financial systems, albeit a 
narrower range of developments than highlighted here.
5
 
 
Thirty years ago, Zysman published what rapidly became the work of reference on the 
political economy of national financial systems.
6
 Zysman gives equal prominence to 
potential pressures on NFCs from holders of their debt – banks and bond investors – 
and of their equity. The maturity of bank lending, short or long term, was an 
important part of his distinction between financial systems. Questions regarding the 
nature of bank lending, however, have not established themselves in the VoC 
literature.
7
 Non-financial company (NFC) finance in this literature is mainly 
                                                 
3
 Hall and Soskice 2001, 6. 
4
 There are a small number of important exceptions, notably Deeg 1999. 
5
 Hackethal 2001; Levine 2002; Rajan and Zingales 2003. 
6
 Zysman 1983. 
7
 Exceptions include, on long-term lending in Germany, Vitols 1998. 
 5 
important due to the extent to which the use of equity financing and changes in the 
equity investor base raise corporate governance issues for NFCs. The key causal 
mechanism in the VoC literature therefore stems from the concentration or dispersion 
of share ownership (on which there is significant cross-national variation
8
), or the 
extent of equity financing, relative to bank borrowing, by NFCs.
9
 The continued 
viability of institutional diversity hinges on the ability of what the VoC literature 
labels Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), such as those in Germany and Japan, 
to shield company managers from the short-term imperatives of equity investors that 
are characteristic of, and frequently perceived as coming from, Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs).
10
 
 
The close association of bank credit-based systems, ‘patient capital’ and the other 
core elements of CMEs has been explored in both the CPE and economics 
literatures:
11
 including cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates, long-term 
corporate investment decisions, worker involvement in company decision-making, 
effective training schemes (apprenticeship programs) and stable long-term 
employment relations including worker retraining and cooperative wage bargaining. 
‘Relational’ banking and long-term finance enable investment strategies with delayed 
returns and long-term employment, rather than short-term profit maximization. The 
focus on the long-term enables NFCs to provide for longer-term employment, which 
results in improved training and retraining programs. Worker representation on NFC 
boards is more common in CMEs, In Germany it extends to co-determination. 
Further, the limited public availability of data on the financial performance of NFCs 
                                                 
8
 Gourevitch and Shinn 2005. 
9
 Beyer and Höpner 2003. 
10
 Culpepper 2005. 
11
 See, e.g., Allen and Gale 2000; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Deeg 2010. 
 6 
that do not issue equity or have highly concentrated equity ownership increases the 
need for bank and other NFC-investor involvement in corporate governance, in order 
to access information.
12
 The cross-shareholding and network corporate governance 
that decreases the autonomy of senior managers who are compelled to consult 
supervisory boards results in a more consensual decision-making style that further 
increases emphasis on the long-term.  
  
Hall and Soskice note that ‘[f]inancial deregulation could be the string that unravels 
coordinated market economies’.13 However, the extent to which these other elements 
of the CME rely upon the continuation of ‘patient’ capital is subject to ongoing 
disagreement in the literature. Many scholars examine the potential erosion of other 
CME elements due to a variety of factors including: an increased reliance by large 
CME NFCs on equity capital and financialization more generally,
14
 increased 
transparency and investor protection, decreased concentration of existing equity 
holdings, some decline in cross-shareholding, decline in blockholding and the 
departure of bank and insurance company directors from company boards.
15
 However, 
most scholars also downplay change, emphasizing rather continuity or evolutionary 
change determined largely by the CME institutional framework.
16
 Many note that 
evidence of change is inconclusive.
17
  
 
The consideration of the nature of NFC financing in this debate focuses on two broad 
issues: first, the balance of NFC financing between bank loans and equity; and 
                                                 
12
 Bathelt and Gertler 2005. 
13
 Hall and Soskice 2001, 64. 
14
 Beyer and Höpner 2003. 
15
 On Germany see Fiss and Zajac 2004; Culpepper 2005; Deeg and O’Sullivan 2009. 
16
 Bathelt and Gertler 2005. 
17
 Culpepper 2005; Deeg 2010. 
 7 
second, the changing nature of the investors in equity. Are shareholdings concentrated 
in long-term, patient banks and insurance companies, or dispersed across short-term, 
shareholder value-focused international equity fund managers?
18
 Implicit in the 
consideration of equity financing is a recognition that the nature of equity investors 
can vary and a view that this variation has a material impact on NFCs’ business 
model. The same close attention has not, however, been paid to the nature of bank 
lending, a key component of the existing typology.        
 
The result is a static conception of bank lending and an assumption that it should be 
contrasted with market-based sources of finance. As we show below, this assumption 
leads to the conclusion that, by the standard comparison of bank-based and market-
based sources of NFC finance, the economies we consider have since 2000 mostly 
become more bank-based. We argue that closer attention to the nature of banking 
shows that these economies have nearly all become more market-based. Further, this 
clearer picture of bank activities has implications for consideration of diversity and 
convergence amongst capitalist systems.
19
 Banking is a potential source of 
differentiation in new ways related to the market basis of bank lending and complex 
change occurs not only in continental Europe but also the UK and the US. This does 
not yield a picture of convergence to a static “Anglo-Saxon” type but points to a 
dynamic and multi-dimensional framework for understanding variation.,We argue that 
in contemporary economies there is no simple correspondence between typologies of 
financial systems and modes of capitalism.
20
  
 
                                                 
18
 Culpepper 2005; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005. 
19
 See, e.g., Berger and Dore 1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks 
and Stephens 1999; Whitley 1999; Schmidt 2002. 
20
 Cf. Deeg 2010. 
 8 
CMEs depend in part on a very specific role for banks as bulwarks against the 
influence of financial markets on NFCs. The banks’ bulwark role comes from being 
suppliers of patient capital to clients with which they have a relational, not arms-
length, interaction. Increased equity funding relative to bank loans increases market 
pressures on NFCs, because of the demands of (often assumed to be international) 
equity investors relative to patient capital. Banks can supply two kinds of patient 
capital: long-term holdings of equity or long term bank loans. When Hall and Soskice 
published, CME banks already held fewer shareholdings than at the time of Zysman’s 
writing
21
 and were expanding their investment banking activities.
22
 Yet most CPE 
scholars writing on NFC finance in CMEs have insisted on the persistence of patient 
capital. They point first to the role of NFCs and/or insurance companies in the patient 
holding of NFC equity.
 
 Second they emphasize the continued importance of 
relational banking in CMEs, allowing ‘access to capital independent of current 
profitability’,23 most notably in the archetypal bank-based financial system, 
Germany.
24
 Such systems exhibit high aggregate bank lending as a percentage of NFC 
finance.
25
 The first claim, that NFC shareholding of other NFC equity is a source of 
patience, is irrefutable, as this is long-term investment that is unlikely to be reversed 
in the face of short-term difficulties at either the investor or investee firm. We argue 
that the second claim is more problematic. It implies that the changing activities of 
banks do not have an impact upon their role as patient lender to NFCs. The argument 
depends on banks being able to lend long-term and to continue to support their NFC 
clients regardless of market pressures on the banks themselves. We argue that this 
                                                 
21
 Hall and Soskice 2001, 23. See also Jackson and Moerke 2005. 
22
 Hall and Soskice 2001, 62. 
23
 Hall and Soskice 2001, 16. 
24
 Hall and Soskice 2001, 62; Vitols 2004; Deeg 2010. The continued importance of 
the Hausbank to German NFCs is also challenged; see Beyer and Höpner 2003.  
25
 Vitols 2004; Deeg 2010. 
 9 
view of banks as bulwarks against market pressures has become problematic, and 
relies – in contrast to extensive analysis of the changing nature of equity financing – 
on a static conception of banks and loans and an unwillingness to consider in detail 
this area of financial markets.  
 
Our focus on banks and lending, and on the rise of market-based banking, highlights a 
crucial source of change which undermines ‘patient capital’. Market-based banking 
undercuts the central position of ‘relational’ banking by increasing the position of 
market considerations relative to long-term bank business decisions, where a bank 
sacrifices short-term profitability in the expectation of subsequent recompense.
26
 Of 
further importance is that the rise of market-based banking potentially affects 
corporate governance in small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) which depend more 
heavily on bank financing than in larger firms which tend to have more diversified 
funding, including equity. This would include the German Mittelstand whose 
unchanged financing sources are emphasized in the debate on CME change.
27
  
 
To be patient with NFC borrowers, banks must be able to resist financial market 
pressures they themselves face.
28
 Relationship banking involves ‘intertemporal 
transfers in loan pricing’29 and/or recompense for current loss, or opportunity cost, on 
                                                 
26
 Aoki 1995; Aoki and Dinç 2000; Rajan and Zingales 2003. 
27
 Deeg 2010. German banks do not generally either own equity in, or sit on boards 
of, SMEs (Vitols 1998). 
28
 Aoki 1995; Rajan and Zingales 2003. Market-based banking should not be seen as 
the only source of change in the relationship banking which underpins the CME 
model. NFCs must also be willing and able to ignore short-term market signals. The 
relationship can be undermined by direct market pressures on NFCs, or by increased 
competition reducing bank’s power over NFCs.  
29
 Boot 2000, 13. 
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lending from future bank-NFC business activities other than loans.
30
 For this to be 
possible, banks must not only have the power over NFCs necessary to prevent 
subsequent defection, but also the power to resist market pressures on their current 
lending decisions.
31
 Similarly, in order to make the long-term loans, which form part 
of their provision of ‘patient capital’ to NFCs,32 banks must themselves have either 
stable sources of short-term financing to underpin their maturity transformation 
function, or sources of long-term financing.
33
 The monitoring by relationship banks of 
NFC borrowers also helps to overcome information asymmetry problems, particularly 
in systems involving a main bank or Hausbank.
34
 Market-based banking has the 
potential both to undermine the relationship-banking model and reduce the ability to 
benefit from monitoring, because the profitability of lending is increasingly 
determined by market prices. Market-based banking should therefore be seen as a 
potentially significant source of change to ‘patient capital’ and the complementary 
features of the CME model, as well as a further source of change within LMEs.  
 
 
The market-based banking model introduced here, and discussed in more detail 
below, focuses on a particular set of business activities banks chose increasingly in 
most advanced industrial economies beginning in the late 1990s. These involve both 
the continuation but significant expansion of activities from earlier periods and new 
activities, either for all or the majority of banking systems. Even for continued 
                                                 
30
 Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 1995; Deeg 1998. 
31
 Rajan and Zingales 2003, 12. 
32
 Zysman 1983; Vitols 1998. 
33
 On the importance of long-term financing to the ability of German banks to make 
long-term loans to NFCs, see Vitols 1998. 
34
 Aoki 1995; Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 1995; Aoki and Dinç 2000; Deeg 1998; Vitols 
1998. 
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banking activities, significant data limitations preclude direct comparison with earlier 
periods. Increased post-crisis data, particularly from regulatory authorities, has 
increased transparency and highlighted previous inadequacies,
35
 but has not provided 
significant historical data on specific types of bank activities. Still, the developments 
discussed here can be placed in longer-term context: from 1980-2000, deposits 
represented a declining share of bank liabilities in G7 countries except Japan 
(unchanged) and France;
36
 loans declined as a share of bank assets in G7 countries 
except Canada and Italy; and a customer funding gap (loans exceeding deposits) 
emerged on aggregate across the G7.
37
 In the analysis below, we show how these 
trends continued and accelerated from 2000. 
 
Banks’ business strategies reflect both bankers’ choices as well as the set of national 
and supranational institutions in which banks operate. Clearly, institutional factors 
shape bankers’ business choices: banking regulation and banking supervision,38 
corporate governance rules,
39
 fiscal (tax) policy, the structure of other financial 
institutions in place (notably equity and bond markets) and protectionism in the 
banking sector. However, banks must still be seen as agents in this context: making 
business decisions, engaging in financial innovation and responding to their own 
experience in the market (including their experience with global liquidity and 
previous banking crises) and not just as institutionally-embedded actors.
40
   
 
                                                 
35
 See, e.g., Financial Stability Board 2011. 
36
 Byrne and Davis 2003, 159. Increasing inter-bank deposits mean customer deposits 
declined even more (ibid., 155).  
37
 Ibid., 156. 
38 Pagano and Volpin 2001; Busch 2009. 
39
 Laeven and Levine 2009. 
40
 Crouch 2005; Hall and Thelen 2009. 
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Questioning the Financial System Dichotomy  
 
Zysman’s main contribution was to show how three different types of national 
financial structures, depicted as relatively static and dominated by different financial 
activities and institutions, shaped the scope for government action and industrial 
development: capital market-based; credit-based in which governments set prices and 
intervened in the market; and credit-based, in which banks also played an important, 
autonomous, role in the economy intermediating between household savers and 
entrepreneurs and could influence prices. Zysman does not use the term ‘bank-based’, 
but the central role of banks is clear in his distinction between ‘the impersonal arm’s 
length dealings of capital markets’ and ‘the personal institutional ties of banks or 
lending institutions’.41  
 
There has been very little effort by CPE scholars either to unpack Zysman’s 
understanding of national financial systems or to move beyond it. Zysman recognizes 
differences in bank activities across countries, in his contrast between 
overwhelmingly short-term bank lending in capital market-based systems and 
similarly predominant long-term bank lending in credit-based economies.
42
 Zysman 
also recognizes the static nature of his analysis and the clear possibilities of change in 
financial systems.
43
 Zysman encouraged future researchers to consider the impact of 
‘ever more elaborate financial markets’ on national systems of capitalism.44 Yet we 
continue to see the assumptions regarding banks that underpin Zysman’s original 
typology and its use in the VoC literature, remaining more or less unchallenged in 
                                                 
41
 Zysman 1983, 63. 
42
 Ibid., 192. 
43
 Zysman 1983., 287. 
44
 Ibid., 281. 
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CPE’s limited consideration of credit provision in western economies.  
 
The dichotomy we highlight pre-dates the seminal work by Zysman. For political 
economists, his contribution was mainly to set out the linkages between financial 
systems and the ability of governments to intervene in the economy. Our main 
justification for going back to a 30 year-old text to help understand modern financial 
systems, however, is Zysman’s close focus on financial systems, and his largely 
overlooked articulation of the basis for the standard dichotomy. It rests for Zysman, 
on two key assumptions, both of which we challenge. First, he assumes banks are the 
institutions overwhelmingly responsible for making loans to NFCs. Loans are not 
financial instruments that can be sold, so banks themselves make decisions regarding 
lending, and the profitability of this lending is determined by banks’ assessment of 
creditworthiness. This approach results in financial instrument – loans – and financial 
institution – banks – being largely interchangeable in any empirical analysis, as they 
largely were at the time Zysman was writing. He acknowledges the existence of non-
bank lenders,
45
 but rightly (given their insignificance for NFC financing then) does 
not consider them in any detail.  Zysman asserts that ‘[w]hat makes the financial 
systems different is the relative importance of two types of financial markets; capital 
markets and loan markets’46 and implies a distinction between bank-based and 
market-based provision of credit to NFCs in an economy. This widespread distinction 
underpins the categorization of financial systems by considering the provision of 
credit to NFCs (loan, bond or equity)
47
 or by the relative size of bank assets, equity 
                                                 
45
  Zysman 1983, 61. 
46
 Ibid., 60. 
47
 This ignores both the maturity of bank lending and financing from companies’ own 
retained earnings. See Murinde, Agung and Mullineux 2004.  
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stock market capitalization and outstanding private bond market issuance.
48
  
 
The second key assumption is that, in making their lending decisions, banks do not 
face constraints from their own ability to borrow the funds they must lend. Banks, 
even the investment banking operations of European universal banks, ‘draw their 
funds from deposits’,49 and depositors are loyal. This is central to Zysman’s typology 
and the more standard dichotomy. In contrasting ‘a system based on capital markets 
with resources allocated by prices established in competitive markets’ with ‘a credit-
based system dominated by financial institutions’,50 Zysman is assuming, as many 
others implicitly have,
51
 that the capacity of financial institutions in credit-based 
systems to borrow would not change their dominant role. Zysman also does not 
consider the need for banks to have capital to support lending.
52
 The distinction 
Zysman makes is between financial agents and financial intermediaries.
53
 Banks are 
agents in terms of their lending decisions (the agency we highlight above, in contrast, 
is in regard to their overall business model), whose financial power allows them to 
influence the pricing of credit in an economy. Financial institutions that act as 
intermediaries in the provision of bond and equity financing merely reflect the 
relevant market’s pricing of that financing. 
 
Central to the bank-based system, and therefore to the existing dichotomy, is banks’ 
‘financial power’, derived from the fact that ‘a limited number of financial institutions 
                                                 
48
 E.g., Allen and Gale 2000. 
49
 Zysman 1983, 61. 
50
 Ibid., 55. 
51
 E.g., Rajan and Zingales 2003. 
52
 Changes in banks’ own shareholdings may also be a source of change, as noted by 
an anonymous reviewer.  
53
 Zysman 1983, 57. 
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dominate the system’.54 An oligopoly industry structure with limited competition is 
the primary factor shaping banks’ pricing of their loans. Limited competition in both 
the market for attracting deposits and making loans give the banks pricing power. A 
number of authors have therefore focused on the impact of competition on banks 
‘financial power’, but have concentrated on the ability to prevent NFC defection.55 
This power could be circumscribed in two ways. First, increased competition between 
banks for deposits and to make loans could decrease banks’ ‘concentration of market 
power’ to the extent that both bank deposit funding costs and lending margins are 
determined in more competitive markets.
56
 Alternatively, banking markets could 
remain oligopolistic, but banks could change their business models, shifting away 
from deposits as the financing backing loan activity. We acknowledge the possibility 
of the first development, but we focus here on the erosion of banks’ financial power to 
provide patient capital to NFCs because they are sourcing funds for lending from 
other financial institutions rather than their own cutomers. 
 
We argue that reliance on market-based funding is now generally the case in bank 
lending, although to a different extent across the countries we analyse. In reality, 
banks acting as agents in terms of their business models have undermined their 
‘financial power’ in lending to NFCs. Banks have increasingly turned themselves into 
market intermediaries in these lending activities. Figure 1 shows figures for the 
tightening of bank lending to NFCs from mid-2007 (the intensification of the financial 
crisis) to the end of 2011 due to the ‘cost and availability of funding’, that is the 
                                                 
54 
Ibid., 72. 
55
 See Byrne and Davis 2003; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Lall 2006. As an anonymous 
reviewer pointed out, the concentrated nature of UK bank lending to SMEs, for 
example, suggests there is no automatic link between a lack of competition and 
relationship banking.  
56
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 
 16 
ability of banks to borrow to fund lending.
57
 In Zysman’s conception of banks as 
funded by stable deposits, such a reason for tightened lending conditions cannot be 
envisaged (absent a deposit run). The question asked in the equivalent US survey,
58
 
regarding ‘liquidity in the secondary market for these loans’ (i.e., the ability to sell 
loans to other financial market actors), is even further from a traditional conception of 
banks and loans. However, both these factors made a significant contribution to the 
tightening of bank lending conditions – a credit crunch – in all the countries 
examined. In the UK the ‘cost and availability of funding’ was almost as significant 
as the more nebulous ‘expectations about economic activities’.59 The difficulty for 
banks in financing themselves is clearly not uniform across the countries. As we show 
below, the degree to which banking was ‘market-based’ is a potentially useful 
variable explaining this difference. We also recognize, however, that the impact of 
market-based banking on NFC financing is not only an issue for periods of market 
weakness. We also should expect it to be strongly procyclical in its impact on the 
cost, availability, and potentially maturity, of NFC financing.  
 
 
We would not necessarily expect relative shortening of the maturity of NFC lending 
in the period prior to 2007 due to market-based banking because market-based 
                                                 
57
 The balance of percentage of bank loan officers reporting a tightening (a positive 
number) or an easing (a negative number), relative to the previous three months, 
because of changes in the bank’s own ability to borrow. Data are not available for the 
Netherlands. Japanese banks reported no tightening of bank lending conditions for 
reasons linked to funding. 
58
 US Federal Reserve, ‘Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending 
Practices’, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/. 
59
 UK credit conditions survey data show cumulative tightening due to the ‘cost and 
availability of funding’ over the six quarters from mid-2007 to end 2008 of 233.4; 
cumulative tightening due to ‘expectations about economic activities’ reached 235.8 
(Bank of England, ‘Credit Conditions Survey, Survey Results, 2008 Q4’, January 
2009). 
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sources of lending (most obviously securitization) do provide longer-maturity lending 
and assist the maturity transformation inherent in banking activities. However, our 
argument does lead us to expect long-term lending to decrease disproportionately 
when market conditions for the funds that financial institutions provide one another 
tighten or become unpredictable. As figure 2 for the Euro area shows, this is indeed 
the case. At periods of financial market weakness, the availability of both long- and 
short-term loans is reduced, but long-term lending conditions tighten further.   
 
 
Bank of England (Credit Conditions Survey) and US Federal Reserve data on the 
maturity of loans similarly finds a significant balance of lenders reducing maturities at 
times of financial market weakness.
60
 In addition, the Bank of England has asked, 
from October 2007 until April 2012, about the impact on NFC lending of the need to 
support Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) or similar programs, the reduced 
ability to transfer risk off banks’ balance sheets and conditions for raising capital, all 
aspects of market-based banking discussed below. The cumulative negative figures 
over the period suggest additional and direct links between difficulties in market-
based banking, as described here, and NFC lending.
61
   
 
 
 
                                                 
60
 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/other/monetary/creditconditions.aspx, 
accessed 11 July 2012; http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/, 
accessed 12 July 2012. 
61
 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/other/monetary/creditconditions.aspx, 
accessed 11 July 2012. 
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Market-Based Banking 
 
The term ‘market-based banking’ is not new, but our use of it expands on previous 
usage to allow a clearer understanding of banks and the provision of credit to NFCs, 
and a comparative approach to higher income country financial systems. Previously, 
market-based banking has been applied to the ‘shadow banking system’: those parts 
of the financial system that provide credit, but are not commercial banks, such as 
investment banks and money market funds.
62
 In this usage, shadow banking focuses 
on the ‘originate and distribute’ business model. In this model, banks ‘disintermediate 
themselves’ by not keeping loans on the balance sheet but selling them to other 
financial market actors – or are disintermediated by those other financial market 
actors providing credit directly. This familiar story of the disintermediation of banks 
involves loans being market-based. It is incomplete, however, in failing to consider 
the huge increases in the size of banks in recent years. If banks are being 
disintermediated in favor of market-based sources of financing, then their assets 
should be decreasing relative to the size of the economy. While this is the case in 
bank-based Italy and (recession-bound) Japan, it is not the case in countries as 
supposedly varied as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
63
 Moreover, if this disintermediation was the dominant trend of 
the period leading to the 2007 financial crisis, national financial systems would have 
become more market-based on the traditional measures, as bank assets decreased 
relative to equity capitalization and the size of private bond markets, and bank lending 
became relatively less important to NFC borrowing. As Figure 3 shows, bank assets 
increased relative to the size of equity and bond markets in 2000-07 in all the 
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63
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countries considered except Japan and Spain. In other words, by this measure, all but 
two national systems became more bank-based. In the previous decade, this was the 
case only in Japan.
64
 
 
 
Similarly, as Figure 4 shows, bank loans became a more significant part of NFC 
financing in five of the eight countries considered.
65
 This includes an archetypal 
market-based system, the UK, where the Bank of England highlights ‘the potential 
benefits of lowering the economy’s reliance on bank finance’.66 This reverses a trend 
in the G7 countries in the previous decade.
67
 
 
 
Our market-based banking framework, therefore, adds an analysis of developments on 
the balance sheets of the commercial banks; specifically, their valuation of assets at 
market prices (which has an impact on bank capital) and their various forms of 
financing from other banks and financial market actors (to the extent that banks are 
not financed, as Zysman assumes, by deposits). Adrian and Shin recognize that ‘at the 
margin all financial intermediators, including commercial banks, have to borrow in 
capital markets as deposits are insufficient to meet funding needs’, but, with echoes of 
Zysman’s ‘financial power’, conclude that ‘[t]he large balance sheets of commercial 
                                                 
64 
World Bank figures for equity and private bond market capitalization go back only 
to 1989. For discussion of market value issues (especially in equity markets), see 
Byrne and Davis 2003.
  
 
65
 The Bank of England does not provide data on NFCs’ outstanding equity. However, 
data on equity flows demonstrates a significant decline of equity issued in real terms 
between 2000 and 2007 and in relation to bank lending. 
66
 Bank of England 2009, 11. 
67
 Byrne and Davis 2003, 78. 
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banks … mask the effects operating at the margin'.68 We demonstrate below that this 
conclusion does not conform to the reality of commercial banking.
69
 Without 
considering the market influences on banks, we cannot understand the nature of NFC 
financing, especially outside the US.   
 
One of the few CPE scholars writing on banks, Deeg, highlights the rise in ‘deal-
based banking’.70 There is clear overlap with our analysis, but, similarly to Adrian and 
Shin, Deeg focuses only on the ‘originate and distribute’ business model (one of four 
elements of our market-based banking model). Outside CPE, the approach has been 
similar. Lall discusses traditional and ‘new’ financial intermediation by non-banks.71 
Erturk and Solari show change in the sources of bank profits.
72
 Similarly partial are 
those analyses that consider the increase in bank holding of securities. Aglietta and 
Breton note that banks add a ‘new market portfolio’ to their ‘traditional credit 
portfolio’.73 Gorton and Metrick, in their focus on ‘securitized banking’, consider the 
funding of these securitized assets on the balance sheet, especially by the investment 
banks.
74
 In so doing, they come closest to our concept of market-based banking.
75
 
 
We add to these discussions of banking a consideration of the market-based nature of 
the valuation, hedging and funding of loans that stay on bank balance sheets: in other 
words, the extent to which even the ‘traditional credit portfolio’ is no longer 
                                                 
68
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69
 On the vulnerabilities of certain German banks’ market funding, see Hackethal 
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70
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traditional. Instead of the unlikely event of a bank run caused by depositors, the risk is 
a run by other, much more skittish, financial institutions.
76
 Banks, as a result, do not 
have the ‘financial power’ to resist market pressures, undermining their ability to be 
patient, and cannot play the coordinating role that is central to the bank-based system.   
 
Table 1 summarizes this contrast between the traditional model of banking and 
market-based banking. In the traditional banking model, commercial banks make 
loans, keep them on their balance sheets and finance their lending with stable 
customer deposits: banks act as agents. Traditional banking underpins the bank-
based/market-based dichotomy. Absent the unlikely event of a customer run on 
deposits, banks face no funding constraints. The lending decision is driven by a 
bank’s own view of creditworthiness and its relationship with the borrower. The 
profitability of lending is determined solely by borrowers’ payment of the interest on, 
and repayment of, the loan. Banks have the ability to play their coordination role 
within a CME. 
 
 
In market-based banking, there are a number of key differences from the ‘traditional’ 
model. The financial institution making a loan may not be a commercial bank, but 
could be a ‘parallel’ bank, without customer deposits and therefore ordinarily lacking 
lender of last resort support from the central bank.
77
 These are a close equivalent of 
                                                 
76
 See, e.g., Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 2008, 2. Byrne and Davis 
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77
 See Adrian and Shin 2010 for the distinction between shadow and parallel banks. A 
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the ‘specialized lending institutions’ Zysman acknowledges.78 While in 1983, such 
institutions could be safely ignored, they are now central to credit provision in the US. 
The total assets of investment banks, one group of parallel banks most affected in 
2007-08, reached 30 per cent of US commercial bank assets before the crisis.
79
 If 
commercial banks or the now-important parallel banks keep loans, they are hedged 
using Credit Default Swaps (‘CDS’)80 and/or financed through the wholesale markets. 
However, loans may not be kept, but sold to the market, either directly or through 
securitization: ‘originate and distribute’. As a result, the distinction, central to 
Zysman’s typology, between loans that remain on bank balance sheets and market-
based bonds and equities, has broken down. Loans can also be sold to ‘shadow’ 
banks, entities that are wholly or partly off the balance sheets of the banks, but only as 
long as market financing is available. As a result of all these activities, the pricing and 
availability of lending are determined not by banks as agents, as in a bank-based 
system, but banks as market intermediaries.  
 
As indicated above in the discussion of central bank lending surveys, the impact of 
market-based banking upon NFCs is significant. While equity issuance may expose 
NFCs to greater short-term pressure than traditional relationship-based bank 
borrowing, the new market-based credit financing potentially exposes NFCs to greater 
market-driven volatility than equity financing, as ‘patient’ bank credit is 
undermined.
81
 Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel show how credit-dependent sectors 
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grow faster in normal times and are hit harder in tough times,
82
 while Ivashina and 
Scharfstein show that banks with higher customer deposits (and therefore less market-
based) reduced lending less during the recent financial crisis.
83
 Therefore, where 
banks are themselves dependent on the market for their financing, they are unable to 
perform the role of bulwarks against market pressures that the concept of a bank-
based system assigns to them. Instead of patiently acting as a bulwark, banks transmit 
those pressures to their NFC customers just as a financial market intermediary would 
in bond or equity markets. Furthermore, lending-related pressures are transmitted 
more widely across an economy, including to SMEs that are less likely to finance 
through equity and bonds and are therefore more likely to depend on loan markets. As 
these loan markets become market-based, this alternative source of market pressures 
potentially challenges a view that change has only occurred at the level of large firms, 
through increased issuance of equity and bonds, but not at SMEs.
84
  
 
Market-Based Banking and the 2007-08 Financial Crisis 
 
To understand market-based banking, it is necessary to look in detail at some of the 
specific activities, involving both the assets and liabilities of banks. The financial 
crisis of 2007-08 revealed much more about the reality of bank activities, and in 
particular their market-based nature. In this section, we therefore combine 
consideration of developments in the years from 2000 to 2007 with an examination of 
the crisis itself. Where these developments are also important before 2000, and 
sufficient data exist, we also consider an earlier time period. We consider four core 
                                                 
82
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elements of market-based banking, on both the asset and liability sides of bank 
balance sheets, all central to banks’ ability to lend. These are the extent to which: 1. 
assets are valued at market prices (‘marked to market’); 2. bank lending is securitized 
or traded; 3. bank assets are sold to ‘shadow banks’; and 4. assets retained on balance 
sheets are financed from market sources. 
   
1.Increased ‘Marked to Market’. Bank assets that are not priced on the balance sheet 
according to market prices will remain at their original value, absent a clear reason for 
change (such as credit impairment on a loan). In contrast, the value of bank assets that 
are ‘marked to market’ is determined by prevailing market prices.85 This is the ‘new 
market portfolio’ discussed by Aglietta and Breton.86 Market prices increase/decrease 
profitability, increasing/decreasing the ability to retain earnings to increase capital,
87
 
and, through the impact of profitability on bank share prices, increasing/decreasing 
the ability to raise new capital. Through the ‘Value at Risk’ method of valuing 
marked to market assets, increased volatility also increases the amount of capital 
banks require.
88
 Estimates of the losses on US sub-prime mortgage securities, based 
on prevailing market prices in 2008, were nearly 60 per cent greater than losses 
implied by the Bank of England’s assumption regarding actual default-related losses 
(a proxy for fundamental value).
89
 For UK prime mortgage securities, losses were 85 
per cent greater.
90
 It therefore matters whether or not the value of bank assets are 
determined by market prices. The issue, however, is not one solely of losses, but of 
procyclicality, as higher market prices can also increase profitability and lending 
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capacity.
91
  
 
The value of a loan remaining on a bank’s balance sheet at its original value (‘historic 
cost’) is determined by the bank’s correct assessment of the borrower’s 
creditworthiness. If a loan is marked to market, the profitability is determined by a 
successful assessment of the asset’s market value. As a result, the nature of the 
lending decision changes in a way that undermines the distinction between a loan and 
bonds or equity. Even if a loan is not sold, its market value determines its terms. 
Banks’ marking to market varies across countries, although the data are incomplete. 
     
 
The data in Table 2 make clear that the impact of market prices directly on bank 
assets is low in Italy, Japan and Spain; but this impact is high in France, the UK and, 
allowing for the investment banks, the United States. The Netherlands lies between, 
and the data on Germany is insufficient.
92
 For those countries where a high proportion 
of bank assets are marked to market, excessively weak market prices cause difficulties 
for banks, sufficient in the financial crisis to be one explanation for the sub-prime 
crisis becoming systemic.
93
 The controversial regulatory response was selectively to 
suspend mark-to-market accounting rules.
94
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2. Increased securitizing and trading of loans. The marking-to-market of assets 
discussed above involves loans that are retained by banks. However, many are also 
sold. Increasingly in the period analyzed here, commercial banks moved to an 
‘originate and distribute’ business model. Banks made loans, not to keep them on 
their own balance sheets, but to sell them to other financial market actors. This further 
undermines Zysman’s distinction between loans and market-based bonds and equities, 
as loans become simply another financial market asset.
95
 ‘This is not the way that 
banks operated for hundreds of years’.96 The lending decision is directly linked to the 
market via the ability to sell and the pricing of any sale. There are two broad ways in 
which such distribution can take place. The first is through direct sales of the loans 
themselves, a largely post-2000 activity; the second is as a result of various forms of 
securitization, which had started in the US in the 1980s but expanded markedly in the 
years before the crisis. The securitized assets are then in turn sold directly to the 
market or to shadow banks. Whether sold directly or securitized before sale, the loan 
is made only because the bank expects it can be sold, and the terms of the loan are 
determined by that prospective sale. Loans are not a unique instrument held only by 
banks, as in the bank-based/market-based dichotomy, but are traded like any other 
financial instrument. 
 
Much of the direct sales of loans represent genuine distribution of risk outside the 
banking system: by 2007 institutional (non-bank) investors bought 62 per cent of 
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leveraged loans in the US;
97
 in Europe one estimate for 2006 exceeds 40 per cent.
98
 
Trading loans is a relatively new activity, but has grown very rapidly in recent years. 
The trading volume of loans in the United States reached US$520 billion in 2007,
99
 a 
fivefold increase from 2000. Gorton sees the ratio of secondary market loan sales to 
outstanding commercial and industrial loans peaking in 2007 at over 25 per cent.
100
 
Yet in Japan there is no secondary loan market.
101
 Although ‘relatively nascent’,102 
European markets had trading volumes in 2007 at US$225 billion.
103
 A further 
indication of the loan market’s size, and of its sensitivity to overall market pressures, 
is that early in the financial crisis, banks were caught with US$300 billion of loans 
they had planned to sell.
104
  
        
Loans are not only sold directly to the market, but are also sold by way of 
securitization: the repackaging of pools of loans into tradable bonds. The large 
securitization market in the US is well known, but securitization of European assets 
has also been significant, although there is considerable country variation (see Table 
3). Even in the US, despite being long-established, securitization has increased very 
rapidly: 2007 issuance was more than double 2000 levels.
105
 In Europe, growth was 
even more dramatic: from just €78.2 billion in 2000 to €453.7 billion in 2007.106 
European securitization has therefore grown from largely insignificant levels in 2000 
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to amounts that represent a significant proportion of GDP in a number of European 
countries (see Table 3 below). Securitization, and the ‘originate and distribute’ model 
of banking generally, underpins increased bank lending in benign market conditions, 
but increases the severity of a credit crunch when markets fall. Deutsche Bank makes 
the connection explicit in its (pre-crisis) 2006 annual report: ‘A sudden drop in 
investor demand for asset-backed securities could cause us to restrict our lending 
thereafter for the types of loans we securitize’.107 Securitization rose to about half of 
UK banks’ market funding by 2008.108 The decisions by US, European and UK 
central banks to support the securitization markets are further proof of their 
importance,
109
 as is the IMF’s conclusion that ‘repairing securitization is critical to 
supporting the supply of credit’.110  
 
Seabrooke sees securitization as increasing bank power through the increased 
profitability it affords.
111
 However, securitization is central to a decline in banks’ 
‘financial power’ to limit the impact of the market on their clients.112 In securitization, 
not only is the pricing and availability of financing determined by the market, but the 
ability of banks to coordinate the rescue of companies in difficulty
113
 is further 
undermined. As with the selling of loans, the banks are no longer the lenders whose 
interests are central to any corporate restructuring. An additional difficulty with the 
structure of securitizations is that the interests of investors can conflict, making 
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resolution all the more difficult.
114
 
 
 
Clearly the US stands far ahead of all other countries in the significance of 
securitization to lending. However, securitization was also an important influence on 
lending capacity in a number of continental countries, including two, Italy and Spain, 
where bank lending relies significantly on wholesale funding sources (see Figure 4). 
Overall, in the first quarter of 2009, securitization accounted for 28 per cent of 
outstanding credit in the US, 14 per cent in the UK and 6 per cent in the Euro area.
115
 
In some countries where securitization activity was relatively low, however, growth 
was rapid. German securitization issuance, for example, was in 2006 over five times 
the level in 2004.
116
 Such securitization was not confined to mortgages. Outstanding 
European securitized collateral other than residential mortgages totaled just under 
€600 billion at Q1 2008, with the US at a further €1.5 trillion equivalent.117 
 
Although in theory securitization involves the outright sale of assets, much of the risk 
transfer of securitization proved illusory, with banks retaining very significant 
proportions of securitizations,
118
 and valuing them at market prices. It was therefore 
also a part of the  increased marking to market of assets discussed above. 
Furthermore, securitization involved selling many assets to entities that retained a 
close connection to the commercial banks. We turn next to these entities: the 
                                                 
114
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‘shadow’ banking system.              
 
3. Increased ‘Shadow Banking’. ‘Shadow banking’ has been used to describe banking 
activity outside the commercial banking system.
119
 Pozsar et al. differentiate ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ shadow banking and parallel banking.120 For greater clarity, we 
distinguish lending activity by the commercial banks that until the financial crisis was 
wholly or partially off the banks’ balance sheets (shadow banking) from banking 
activity that takes place separate from, in ‘parallel’ with, the activities of the 
commercial banks. Shadow banking is therefore a particular instance of the wholesale 
funding of bank balance sheets (see below). Shadow banking was important in a 
number of developed economies, while parallel banking has only been significant in 
the US.
121
  
 
Loans, often as securitizations, are sold to ’special purpose vehicles’ established by 
banks with the single purpose of buying these assets and financing them by issuing 
securities. The most important of these vehicles, on which we focus, are ABCP 
programs, which borrow short term, usually from money market funds.
122
 Banks 
sponsor the establishment of ABCP programs, and provide them with guarantees. 
Profit comes from the difference between their interest income and cost of borrowing, 
assisted by the reduced requirement for capital to support the lending.
123
 ABCP 
programs therefore, in good market conditions, increase the availability of credit in an 
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economy, and also increase bank profitability. However, the banks’ guarantees leave 
them committed to lending, secured on ABCP assets, if financing is unavailable. 
Banks then own the underlying assets of the ABCP program in an ‘involuntary 
reintermediation’, pressuring banks’ capital and liquidity – a further example of 
market-based and procyclical lending. Outstanding ABCP reached US$1.3 trillion in 
July 2007, a larger amount than outstanding US government Treasury bills, and a 
doubling since January 2004.
124
 However, from August to December 2007 (a year 
before Lehman’s collapse) outstanding ABCP fell to US$833 billion. As noted above, 
the Bank of England’s surveys revealed the direct negative implications for UK bank 
lending of this contraction in the ABCP market. 
 
ABCP is important for two reasons. First, losses on the market-based ABCP assets, as 
a result of the guarantees given, reduced the bank capital needed to support lending. 
In extreme examples, such as Landesbank Sachsen and IKB Deutsche Industriebank 
in Germany, or Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK, reduced bank capital due to losses 
on ABCP assets was a major factor in bank collapse. Support for ABCP was high, 
measured as a percentage of GDP, in the Netherlands,
125
 Germany and the UK. 
Support was moderate in France and the US, and low in Japan, Italy and Spain.
126
 The 
second importance of ABCP was as a source of lending in the various countries 
considered. Table 3 above shows the assets of ABCP programs by country and 
therefore the direct impact of this lending on credit in each country.
127
 As a 
percentage of GDP, Germany is at the same level as the US, and all are behind the 
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UK and the Netherlands.  
 
4. Increased Market-Based Liabilities. We move now to consider the market-based 
liabilities of banks. The liability side of the balance sheet has moved far from the 
traditional conception of bank lending funded by customer deposits. First, as 
discussed by Gorton and Metrick in the case of ‘securitized banking’, financing 
increases on a very short-term secured basis in the repurchase, or ‘repo’ market.128 
The problems in this market have been well-documented elsewhere in the case of the 
US, but were also significant in Europe.
129
 Although these securities include many 
unrelated to NFC lending (especially government securities), bonds issued by NFCs 
are also included. Second, and of greater significance in Europe than the US, a 
‘funding gap’ has developed in many countries as the loans that banks make have 
exceeded their deposits.
130
 Market borrowing is required to fill the vast majority of 
this gap. Figure 5 shows the development of this funding gap for the countries 
considered here: 
 
 
Slightly different data reported in different countries make comparisons difficult, but 
a number of clear conclusions can be drawn. Banks in all countries, except Japan, 
need to borrow from the market to finance their lending, and in all countries, except 
Germany, this requirement increased. Despite the falling funding gap in Germany and 
Japan’s increasing surplus of deposits over loans, the aggregate funding gap across 
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the eight systems increased by approximately US$2 trillion in this period. The 
increased variation between countries is also significant.  
 
When the funding gap on loans and the financing of securities is combined, the IMF  
estimates UK banks total market financing at over $4 trillion (146 per cent of GDP) 
by end 2007, nearly twice the amount of their US counterparts (only 15 per cent of 
GDP). Even Japanese banks had market funding of US$1.4 trillion (24 per cent of 
GDP), although this is likely to be mainly related to Japanese government bonds. 
Separate country figures for the Euro area are not given, but the Euro area total is 
US$12.4 billion (94 per cent of Euro area GDP).
131
  
 
Although the market funding of the US commercial banks appears small relative to 
the size of the economy, market-based liabilities are primarily in the parallel (most 
importantly, investment) banks. Investment banks, whose assets reached 
approximately 30 per cent of those of US commercial banks, had virtually no 
deposits, and their requirement for market funding (including the market financing of 
securities) reached US$3.7 trillion by 2007, overwhelmingly (86 per cent) short 
term.
132
 While even allowing for the investment banks, market funding in the US was 
relatively low compared to GDP, investment banks had ‘to roll over a large part of 
their funding on a daily basis’.133 Short-term (up to 1 year) bank market funding, the 
most immediate source of market pressure on bank lending, represented 32 per cent of 
US GDP, 65 per cent of UK, 24 per cent of Japanese and 54 per cent of the Euro 
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area.
134
 
 
These figures point to the wide range of wholesale funding sources. The full analysis 
of the market pressures on banks as a result of these different sources of wholesale 
funding is beyond the scope of this paper, but the markets can be distinguished in two 
ways. First, by the maturity of borrowing; shorter maturity liabilities, including 
borrowing from other banks, transmitted market problems to banks’ financing more 
quickly. At the pre-crisis peak, over 80 per cent of all commercial paper investment 
was 1-4 days in maturity, for example.
135
 The majority of unsecured interbank 
borrowing was for less than a week.
136
 Banks reliant on longer-term sources of 
funding, such as various forms of bonds, face less immediate refinancing pressures. 
Second, wholesale markets must be distinguished by their fragility: the financial crisis 
has demonstrated that some wholesale markets are more fragile than others, making 
the impact on lending of market difficulties more immediate for those systems more 
dependent on those markets. Table 4 sets out the timing and severity of the impact of 
the crisis on the most important bank funding markets.  
 
 
There is no single way to measure the variation in the exposure to the market, but 
market funding can be divided broadly into financing from other banks (with 
borrowing from international banks and especially in foreign currencies particularly 
vulnerable to withdrawal in the event of market weakness), and financing through the 
bond and non-bank money markets (with the maturity of financing, and the fragility 
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of certain bond markets both concerns). We recognise, however, that the stability of 
the same type of financing varied across countries. A particular type of bond, covered 
bonds,
137
 is longer established in Germany (Pfandbriefe) than elsewhere, and more 
stable. Similarly, many German and Italian banks sell unsecured bonds to their own 
clients or related savings banks, a more stable source of demand than ‘the market’ 
more generally.
138
  Nevertheless, increased exposure to wholesale funding generally 
goes hand-in-hand with financing from less stable sources.  
 
We have discussed four facets of market-based banking: marked-to-market asset 
pricing; securitization and trading of loans; shadow banking and market-based 
liabilities. A full analysis of each of the national financial markets discussed here or 
quantification and aggregation of each facet into an overall index of “marketization” 
is beyond our scope in this article. We do present a stylized array of countries along a 
continuum for heuristic purposes (see figure 5). A continuum is preferable to a 
typology because the four facets may relate to and shape the rest of the political 
economy differently and they suggest a multi-dimensional characterization that places 
most countries in our sample in a middle ground between traditional banking and high 
levels of market-based banking. Introducing a third type would mask potentially 
important conceptual specification and empirical nuance. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the banking systems of the eight case study banking systems in 
terms of the extent to which the areas of market-based banking discussed above are 
important to bank lending activity. This provides detailed support for the assessment 
on the banking systems in table 6, in terms of the relative market-based nature of bank 
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  For further detail, see IMF 2009a: 90. 
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 See Westdeutsche Landesbank 2009, 97; Bayerische Landesbank 2009, 33. 
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assets and liabilities, and the importance of parallel banking. 
 
 
This analysis allows us to reach a conclusion as to the extent of market-based banking 
in each country, best displayed along a continuum (see Figure 5). The countries can 
effectively be distinguished by the degree to which banking in each country has 
moved away from the view of banks in the VoC account towards lending that depends 
on the market. In all cases, commercial banks have a reliance on the market to fund 
their lending that compromises, to varying degrees across countries, their ‘financial 
power’. In the so-called CMEs, this represents an undermining of the ability to fulfill 
a coordinating role. More fundamentally, it undermines the very bank-based / market-
based dichotomy. These insights provide a challenge to the existing VoC literature. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article challenges the way Comparative Political Economy conceptualizes bank-
based financial systems. It starts by examining Zysman’s seminal work. For Zysman, 
the distinguishing feature of loans is that they are not traded financial instruments, and 
therefore, their price is not set directly by markets. The distinguishing feature of 
banks in bank-based systems is that they have the ‘financial power’ to influence 
market prices. Neither feature, we argue, accurately represents lending or banks in the 
developed financial systems outside Japan in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Loans are now bought and sold in the market and therefore their terms are set 
directly by market forces. Banks’ ability to lend, where they do retain loans, is 
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constrained by their own ability to borrow from financial markets and by their own 
requirements to raise the capital to support their lending. Many banks are no longer 
funded predominantly by deposits, as is explicit in Zysman’s analysis and implicit in 
CPE’s subsequent consideration of financial systems. Bank lending is therefore 
increasingly market determined. 
 
This analysis of the changed role of banks in CPE has implications that go beyond 
debates about the accuracy of the dominant typology. Zysman and the VoC literature 
have assigned to banks the role of bulwarks against the encroachment of financial 
markets. The ‘patience’ of banks in their holding of corporate equity and their making 
of loans is underpinned by this ability to resist market pressures. Borrowing from Hall 
and Soskice, if changes in banks ‘could be the string that unravels coordinated market 
economies’,139 the analysis here has implications for the broad range of issues upon 
which the CPE literature has focused. The findings of this article about bank financing 
can underpin further research into the shifting patterns of relational banking in 
Germany and other continental European countries, especially at the level of SMEs, 
and the impact upon related features of corporate governance, including the long-term 
nature of corporate investment decisions and the stability of employment relations. 
 
Much CPE literature focuses on questions of convergence of, or the continued 
divergence between, national capitalisms, including financial systems. This literature 
has been overwhelmingly focused on the degree to which continental European 
countries (and notably Germany) have converged with the Anglo-Saxon model, 
typified by the UK and US. Our study has a number of implications for this literature. 
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First, as we show, the two archetypal LMEs have very different financial system 
characteristics, especially if analyzed with the standard empirical data whose utility 
we have questioned. Second, implicit in much of this work is a static conception of 
the Anglo-Saxon model, with which other systems are, or are not, converging. This is 
simply wrong. Indeed, on many of the measures we have highlighted above, change is 
fastest in the LMEs. Third, banking activities are a potential source of either 
convergence or divergence. As so many world leaders survey the wreckage of their 
banking systems following the financial crisis, the economic crisis and in some cases 
the Euro area sovereign debt crisis, it might be tempting to think of this only as a 
question of convergence. However, we have highlighted continuing, and in some 
cases increasing, divergence.  
 
We have examined a very specific period of time, during which the relative decline of 
banks as a source of NFC financing has been reversed.
140
 The global financial crisis, 
the economic crisis that followed, and most recently the Euro area sovereign debt 
crisis have in turn led to ongoing change in banking regulation and practice. An 
obvious issue common to CPE, therefore, is the extent to which the change we 
address is largely cyclical rather than secular. We recognize that some of the wilder 
excesses of pre-crisis market-based banking are unlikely to reappear, and that the 
direction of travel in banking regulation – particularly increased capital and liquidity 
requirements – will at least limit the further expansion of market-based activities.  
 
However, we would highlight a number of reasons to argue that market-based 
banking represents significant and long-lasting institutional change. First, as longer-
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term trends indicate, a return to bank deposits funding all bank lending (i.e., to 
traditional banking on the liabilities side of bank balance sheets) within all but a very 
few national systems appears implausible. Second, while the reasons behind the 
changes have not been a primary focus of this article, they potentially include changes 
in the shareholdings of banks,
141
 competition from other sources of NFC financing or 
between banks (although the evidence remains inconclusive in the latter case),
142
 and 
technological change.
143
  There is no reason to expect any significant reversal of these 
developments.      
 
Government policy, and regulation specifically, are clearly important to explaining 
the causes of market-based banking and to considering its likely future direction. 
Those concerned with economic and regulatory policies are influenced by two 
conflicting concerns:  bolstering growth and increasing control of financial systems. 
Banks are now central to both sides of this conflict. Increased bank capital 
requirements and limitations on liquidity risk point in one direction; attempts to restart 
securitization and guarantee bank bond issues point in the other. Banks are looking to 
increase the proportion of customer deposits in their funding,
144
 but the shadow 
banking system is now as large as it was pre-crisis.
145
 Market-based banking will 
remain central to the provision of credit, at least in developed world economies, and 
must therefore be a part of how we understand national financial systems and interpret 
their implications for the wider political economy. A complete understanding of the 
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 Hardie and Howarth 2009. Market-based banking by ‘not strictly profit-
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 Byrne and Davis 2003, 152. 
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implications of market-based banking requires a more complete research program 
than can be accommodated in a single article, but we have provided here both an 
argument in favor of such a program and an indication of some of its main areas of 
focus.        
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Tables 
 
  
Table 1 Traditional versus Market-Based Banking 
   
 Institutions Loans Funding/
Liabilities 
Of Loans 
Retained 
Credit 
Risk of 
Loans 
Retained 
 
Accounti
ng 
Of 
Loans 
Retained 
Official 
Support 
Pre-Crisis 
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Traditional 
Banking 
Commercial 
Banks/ 
Savings 
Banks
146
  
Retained 
on Balance 
Sheet 
Customer 
Deposits 
Not 
hedged 
At Cost Central 
Bank Lender 
of Last 
Resort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market-
Based 
Banking 
Commercial 
Banks and 
Parallel 
Banks 
(including 
investment 
banks) 
Sold, in 
loan 
market, via 
securitizat- 
ion or to 
shadow 
banks 
(ABCP 
etc.). 
‘Originate 
to 
Distribute’ 
Wholesale 
Market 
(inter-
bank, 
bonds etc.; 
repos for 
parallel 
banks) 
Hedged 
via CDS 
Mark to 
Market 
Central 
Bank Lender 
of Last 
Resort (but 
not for 
parallel 
banks) 
 
 
Table 2 Mark-to-Market Accounting by country, 2007 
 % of 
Assets 
 France 46.5 
  -BNP Paribas 65 
  -Crédit Agricole 44 
  -Societé Générale 46 
Germany  
  -Deutsche 75 
Italy 19 
Japan 27 
Netherlands 28.4 
Spain 17.2 
United Kingdom  
  -Barclays 52 
  -HSBC 40 
  -Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
45 
                                                 
146
 These institutions have different names in different countries, i.e., savings and 
loans, building societies, savings banks, mutual banks.   
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US (Commercial 
banks only) 
26.9 
  -Bank of America 27 
  -Citigroup 39 
  -Goldman Sachs 86 
  -JP Morgan Chase 41 
  -Lehman 42 
  -Merrill Lynch 44 
  -Morgan Stanley 44 
 
Sources: Committee on the Global Financial System (2010), Fitch Ratings (2008) See 
also IMF (2008: 119). 
 
 
Table 3 Securitization Collateral by Country (end 2007) 
 Medium Term 
Securitization 
Collateral (% of 
GDP) 
ABCP 
Collateral  
(% of GDP) 
Total 
Germany 1.6 1.2 2.8 
France 2.9 0.8 3.7 
Italy 7.8 0.8 8.6 
Netherlands 24.1 6.8 30.9 
Spain 16.9 0.4 17.3 
UK 24.8 4.0 28.8 
US 70.1 1.2 71.3 
Japan 1.3 0 1.3 
 
 Source: Authors’ Calculations from European Securitisation Forum, Japan Securities 
Dealers Association. 
Percentage of outstanding ABCP as of 28.2.08 versus total ABCP outstanding and 
GDP as of end 2007. Figures based on ABCP outstanding of €392 billion versus peak 
of €528.9 billion (Q2 2007). Figures also understated because do not include assets 
categorised as ‘global’ or ‘Europe’ (19 per cent of total). 
 
 
 Table 4 Funding Sources During the Crisis 
 
 Pre-crisis Aug 2007 – 
Sept 2008 
Lehman  
Failure 
After Govt.  
Rescue 
Plans 
Short-Term Financing 
Interbank ○ ● ● ● 
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Repurchase ○ ● ● ◘ 
ABCP ○ ● ● ● 
CP ○ ○ ● ● 
Deposits ○ ○ ○/◘ ○ 
Long-Term Financing 
Bonds ○ ◘ ● ●/◘ 
Covered Bonds ○ ○ ● ● 
Securitization ○ ● ● ● 
Key: ○ Financing Available 
         ◘ Signs of Difficulties in Financing 
         ● Impaired 
     Adapted from ECB 2009: 11 
 
    
 
Table 5: A Summary of Market-Based Banking in Eight Case Study Countries 
France: Mark-to-market assets were relatively high, but exposure to ABCP moderate. 
The relatively high funding gap was offset by low exposure to US$ interbank market, 
and borrowing via securitization and ABCP low. 
Germany: A cautious conclusion is necessary given the heterogeneous nature of the 
German banking system, and the limited data on ‘marking to market’ of assets. 
However, guarantees to ABCP were high and a source of very significant difficulties 
in the German banking system. The German funding gap declined over the period, 
and market-based borrowing included relatively robust and long-term covered bonds 
and unsecured bonds sold to retail clients. 
Italy: Mark-to-market assets and ABCP guarantees were low. The funding gap was 
relatively high, but with borrowing from relatively robust and long term sources, 
particularly unsecured bonds sold to retail clients. US$ interbank borrowing was low 
and use of securitization was moderate. 
Japan: Mark-to-market assets and ABCP guarantees were low. Deposits were greater 
than loans.  
Netherlands: Marked-to-market assets were low but guarantees to ABCP were 
exceptionally high. The funding gap was low. The use of securitization was high, but 
its market-based nature was limited by government guarantees. 
Spain: Mark-to-market assets and ABCP guarantees were very low. The funding gap 
was moderate but Spain was the only country to borrow in the US$ inter-bank market 
to finance domestic lending.
 147
 Securitization as a source of financing for domestic 
lending was relatively high. 
United Kingdom: Marked-to-market assets and support for ABCP were high. There 
were a high funding gap and market-based borrowing overall, with the sources of this 
financing both fragile and short-term,
148
 including inter-bank, commercial paper and 
ABCP. 
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 McGuire and von Peter 2009, 10. 
148
 At the end of 2006, a median of 44 per cent of major UK banks’ wholesale funding 
matured within three months (Bank of England 2007: 34). 
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United States: The use of marked-to-market by commercial banks was low as was 
the funding gap (especially relative to GDP), with guarantees to ABCP moderate. 
However, more activities by large US banks were off balance sheet compared to 
European banks. The US is the only country considered with significant parallel 
banks, the market-based assets and liabilities of which were very high. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Market-based banking in eight countries 
 Market-
Based 
Assets 
Market-Based 
Liabilities 
Parallel 
Banking 
France Moderate Moderate Low 
Germany High Moderate Low 
Italy Low Moderate to 
Low 
Low 
Japan Low Low Low 
Netherlands High Low Low 
Spain Low Moderate Low 
United 
Kingdom 
High High Low 
United States Moderate Moderate High 
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Figure 1 Tightening of banking lending due to ‘cost and availability of funding’.* 
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Sources:  Bank lending surveys.  The US Federal Reserve refers to ‘cost and availability of funding’ as ‘Decreased liquidity in the secondary 
market for these loans’. Figures are not made available by the Dutch Central Bank for domestic banks because of competition concerns. Figures 
are not provided for Japanese banks, which rely little on wholesale funding markets. 
*A positive result equals a net tightening of lending according to bank loan officers because of the ‘cost and availability of funding’ for the 
banks’ themselves.149 
                                                 
149
 The limited further tightening of bank lending conditions due to 'cost and availability of funding' in Spain from 2010 appears to contradict our 
findings as to the previous importance of wholesale funding to Spanish bank lending and evident restrictions on this funding in the context of 
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Figure 2 
Loans or Credit Lines to Enterprises
Balance of Banks Reporting Tightening
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Source: ECB Euro Area Bank Lending Surveys April 2003 – April 2012150 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Spain's sovereign debt crisis. The Spanish bank lending survey indicates that general economic conditions have contributed considerably to 
tightening, and the collapse of the Spanish  property market  and construction industry, even if triggered by bank funding, may subsequently be 
over-riding banks’ difficulties with wholesale market funding. 
150
 https://www.ecb.int/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html, accessed 11 July 2012. The crisis in the Euro area has resulted in flows of 
deposits from periphery to core, distorting any country-level comparison. 
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Figure 3 National financial systems (2000 and 2007)  
Bank assets, Private debt market, Equity market capitalisation as a percentage of total financial system assets. 
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Source: World Bank. See Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60 
Figure 4  Nonfinancial company finance (bank loans, securities, equities) as a % of total (2000 and 2007) 
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Sources:  EU member state figures are drawn from the ECB statistics data warehouse and national central bank figures; Federal Reserve Flow of 
Funds, December 2010 and December 2004 releases; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistical Research and Training 
Institute ed. (2001, 2008), Japan Statistical Yearbook, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau; Bank of Japan.  
Banque de France figures. The Bank of England / Treasury does not collect data on outstanding equity issued (only new equity issues and 
growth). The figures for the UK thus only demonstrate the growth of bank lending in relation to securities. 
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Figure 5: Commercial Bank Funding Gap 
Funding Gap (US$bn)
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Sources: European Central Bank (Loans to Euro-residents excluding Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) less Deposits from Euro-deposits 
excluding MFIs), Bank of England 2008, Table 1.7; Federal Reserve H8 Reports (Loans and leases in bank credit, domestically chartered 
commercial banks, less Deposits, domestically chartered commercial banks, both not seasonally adjusted), Bank of Japan Statistics (Deposits, 
Total, domestically chartered banks less loans, Total, major, regional and shinkin banks) See also Bank of England 2009: 32.  
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Figure 6:  A continuum of market-based banking 
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